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1. References to the
literature are kept at
minimum in this paper. It
is not intended to be a
comprehensive survey.
research strategy was to ‘operationalise’ Mundell’s
theory of Optimal Currency Areas (OCA) and
develop ex-ante criteria for assessing the poten-
tial consequences of monetary unification. ‘Oper-
ationalise’ was a term first used by Tam Bayoumi
and Barry Eichengreen (1999), but it applies to a
much wider strand of research than their own1.
The main conclusion from this research pro-
gramme was that compared to the benchmark
case of the US, European Monetary Union (EMU)
would be characterised by stronger asymmetry
across countries (especially the peripheral coun-
tries) and would only be able to rely on signifi-
cantly weaker adjustment mechanisms
(especially because of the low degree of labour
mobility and the absence of any risk-sharing
arrangement). 
Based on these assumptions, concerns were
expressed about the destabilising impact of a one-
size-fits-all monetary policy. They were probably
best captured in a simple but powerful argument
put forward by Sir Alan Walters, the former eco-
nomic adviser to British PM Margaret Thatcher, who
argued that in the presence of major asymmetries
across countries, a single monetary policy would
result in country-specific inflation which would
reduce the real interest rate and have destabilis-
ing pro-cyclical effects. 
Against this background, two debates emerged in
the 1990s. Although there was little doubt that
EMU was not born with the genes of an optimal
currency area, the first debate concerned the
possibility of the euro turning endogenously into
an OCA. Jeff Frankel and Andrew Rose (1997,
1998) argued that a common currency would act
as a powerful driver of convergence and that its
trade-creation effect would result in a higher
degree of business-cycle harmonisation, which in
turn would ease the task of monetary policy.
However, Paul Krugman (1993) argued instead
THE EUROPEAN CRISIS IS OF SUCH MAGNITUDE
that it forces us to ask ourselves new questions
and rethink answers to old ones. Building on
Donald Rumsfeld’s famous distinctions, one can
speak of the ‘known unknowns’ and the ‘unknown
unknowns’ of monetary union. There were, indeed,
things we knew we did not know: some questions
were raised long ago, but never properly answered
and then forgotten, or buried, until the crisis broke
out and shone the spotlight on them. At least for
academics, who can refer policymakers to old writ-
ings full of neglected warnings, and largely also
for the policymakers themselves who knew prob-
lems could arise, these were non-surprises. 
But there were also things that we did not know we
did not know: genuine surprises that were not, or
not fully, foreseen in the academic literature, and
that were not discussed by policymakers. These
unknown unknowns lead us to re-examine
assumptions about the economics of the common
currency, and to rethink the policy architecture of
economic and monetary union.
1 KNOWN UNKNOWNS
The first thing everyone knew was that the coun-
tries participating in the monetary union were no
siblings. At the time of joining they had significant
structural differences (in terms of, for example,
their degrees of development, specialisation and
labour market institutions) and had different
macroeconomic histories, notably in respect of
inflation and the exchange-rate regime. The whole
discussion during the 1980s about the wisdom of
creating a monetary union was about the degree
of convergence reached, and if a common cur-
rency could be envisioned before economic inte-
gration had made further progress.
Significant research effort was devoted in the
1990s to testing if would-be participants in the
euro were fit for currency unification. The main
THE KNOWN UNKNOWNS AND UNKNOWN UNKNOWNS OF EMU Jean Pisani-Ferry
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‘It is striking to observe the degree to which optimistic convergence bets were wrong. From 1999
to 2007, intra-euro area differences accentuated, real exchange-rate misalignments
aggravated, current-account imbalances widened and net foreign asset positions built up.’
An interesting issue for discussion is whether
these developments were the inevitable
consequences of monetary unification or the
result of the particular set of exogenous
conditions that prevailed during 1997-2008: the
fast pre-unification convergence of southern bond
rates towards those of the North, the German drive
to structural reform after it was realised that it had
entered the euro at an unfavourable exchange
rate, high risk appetite during the 2000s or shocks
coming from the growing participation of central
and eastern Europe in European production
networks – thereby strengthening northern
European and especially German manufacturing.
Both a macroeconomic and a structural reading of
the euro crisis are indeed possible, and there has
been no attempt to discriminate between them.
Whichever is the most relevant, however, what is
clear is that policy responses to these
asymmetries were weak at best, and were in fact
mostly non-existent.     
A second, prominent topic in the pre-EMU litera-
ture had to do with the consequences for public
finances of monetary unification. It was pointed
out early on that monetary union involved a risk
that incentives to fiscal laxity would be strength-
ened (see for example Beetsma and Bovenberg,
2001); that games of chicken in the Sargent-Wal-
lace (1981) vein could be played between mone-
tary and fiscal policy; and that the internalisation
or not by governments of fiscal discipline con-
straints was a major issue for the stability of mon-
etary union, because sovereign crises could have
severely disruptive effects. Re-reading the 1998
article of Barry Eichengreen and Charles Wyplosz,
one can only be struck by its prescient character.
The ex-ante literature also discussed if markets
would price sovereign risk accurately, especially
as signals sent by the policy system were ambigu-
ous: the so-called no-bailout clause was meant to
give markets an incentive to price the risk of
default, but the European Central Bank’s collateral
policy did not discriminate between sovereign
bonds (Buiter and Sibert, 2005). On the whole, it is
also fair to say that the risk that a fiscal crisis
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that the paradox of currency unification would be
that by reinforcing agglomeration effects, it would
ultimately strengthen, rather than ease,
specialisation and asymmetry.
The second debate was about the Walters critique.
The destabilising effects of a one-size-fits-all inter-
est rate was rebutted on the grounds that, with
rational expectations, agents would internalise the
monetary constraint and prevent a lasting real
exchange-rate appreciation (Emerson et al, 1990;
Miller and Sutherland, 1993). In other words, the
optimistic view was that the real exchange-rate
channel would be strong enough to balance the
effect of the interest-rate channel. Optimism even
continued to prevail after a degree of inflation per-
sistence was found in the early years of EMU
(Hoffmann and Remsperger, 2005): in the mid-
2000s, it was hoped that remaining divergence
would be short lived.
It is striking to observe the degree to which opti-
mistic convergence bets were wrong. From 1999
to 2007 – nine years in total, until the global crisis
took over and markets started discovering who
was bathing without a swimming suit – intra-euro
area differences accentuated, real exchange-rate
misalignments aggravated, the traded-goods
sector shrank in the South and grew in the North,
current-account imbalances widened and net for-
eign asset positions built up. The common mone-
tary policy translated for the southern countries
into too-low interest rates, triggering a major credit
boom that fuelled domestic demand and resulted
in an unprecedented increase in private indebt-
edness. Against this background, hopes that
trade-creation effects could reduce asymmetries
turned out to be naive. Trade creation has been in
fact very weak (estimated at around 5-10 percent
of GDP, see Baldwin et al, 2008). At the same time,
evidence seems to suggest that agglomeration
effects have been present, as the share of north-
ern Europe (Germany, Austria, Finland and the
Netherlands) in euro-area manufacturing produc-
tion grew from 46 percent in 2000 to 51 percent in
2011.
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would morph into a financial crisis was correctly
anticipated.
Finally, there was a specific discussion on the abil-
ity of the ECB to act as a lender of last resort to the
banking system, especially in view of its price-sta-
bility focus and the absence of an explicit finan-
cial stability mandate (Prati and Schinasi, 1999).
Here, worries expressed in the literature proved to
be excessive, as the ECB in 2007 did not hesitate
long before providing wholesale liquidity to the
banking system. The central bank’s genetic code
was strong enough to compensate for the
absence of explicit treaty provisions.
Against this background, why were warnings,
especially about the risk of economic divergence,
largely ignored by policymakers? One reason was
that EMU was an economic endeavour based on a
political decision, but even under these circum-
stances, policy could have been geared towards
getting member countries and the euro area as a
whole into shape for the new policy regime. This
did not happen. When drawing on the literature,
European policymakers too often practised selec-
tive reading, with worries dismissed and the opti-
mistic interpretation prevailing. There was, for
example, much too much confidence that EMU
could develop into an optimal currency area. per-
haps inevitably, selection criteria were set in nom-
inal rather than real terms, thus making entry
feasible also for countries with weaker funda-
mentals. Post-entry however, and less inevitably,
there was no mechanism (and, more importantly,
little willingness) to ensure real convergence. Also
inevitably, meeting the public debt ratio criterion
was not considered mandatory but, less
inevitably, the commitment to bring it down once
in the euro was weakly enforced, to say the least.
In general, member countries often considered
they had done enough by meeting the explicit
entry criteria. Considering that the euro was
spurring favourable macroeconomic conditions,
they deemed it superfluous to embark on the
politically unappealing processes of structural
reform and fiscal consolidation.
The complacent reading of the literature also pro-
vided a cover for the avoidance of difficult choices.
The assumption that the private economy was
inherently stable, even under this particular type
of macroeconomic policy guidance, opportunely
meant that it was easier to avoid politically diffi-
cult discussions on the reforms needed to make
EMU resilient, and on the appropriateness of over-
sight of national structural and financial policies.
The convenient fiction was that, provided govern-
ment abided by fiscal discipline, economic and
financial stability would be ensured and there was
therefore no need to go beyond the already hard-
to-implement Stability and Growth Pact. 
Therefore, if concerns were not transposed into
concrete action, economist should not be blamed
– though they could have been more vocal. Rather
blame should be apportioned to policymakers
who too often opted for complacency when
designing the building blocks of what turned out
to be a perilously weak monetary union. In fact,
and unsurprisingly perhaps, warnings were only
taken seriously by those governments that had
political or doctrinal reservations about European
monetary unification, such as the United Kingdom
and Sweden. In the UK, the Treasury prepared a
formal report to assess if the ‘five economic tests’
set by the government for joining the euro were
fulfilled (HM Treasury, 2003). Although selective
and on the whole biased, the report was at least a
coherent attempt to provide an economic basis for
the policy discussion. No such reports were pre-
pared in the vast majorities of countries that
decided to join the euro.
2 UNKNOWN UNKNOWNS
The real surprises, however, were not on the
macro-adjustment front. They came instead from
what was considered to be the most significant
achievement of monetary unification, namely
financial integration. It was expected (and hoped)
that the single currency would spur integration
across the previously fragmented European finan-
cial markets – which indeed happened. But the
implications of such financial integration and the
potential for destabilising developments were not
fully understood.
Economists mostly believed this integration would
be stabilising. Portfolio diversification and access
to credit markets were expected to make national
income and wealth less dependent on national
production, and to make national demand less
THE KNOWN UNKNOWNS AND UNKNOWN UNKNOWNS OF EMU Jean Pisani-Ferry
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dependent on national income. As shown by
Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha (1996), in the US,
financial integration was a powerful risk-sharing
channel across states, and unlike migration or the
creation of a federal budget, it was a direct conse-
quence of EMU.
The first surprise has been the strength of the neg-
ative feedback loop between banking fragility and
sovereign weakness – a salient feature of the euro
crisis. The potential for financial destabilisation
resulting from it was ignored – as more generally
was the overall risk of financial instability. For
sure, the existence of such a loop was not an
unknown unknown. The correlation between fiscal
and banking crises is a well-known stylised fact
that emerges from historical experience, and as I
have noted, the destructive potential for the euro
area of sovereign crises was foreseen. What was
not foreseen was the degree to which bank-sover-
eign interdependence could create a potential for
self-fulfilling crises.
There are two reasons why euro-area banks and
sovereigns seem to be indissolubly linked.
Member states keep individual responsibility for
the rescue of their national banking systems and
the huge size of such systems in the euro area –
the average bank assets-to-GDP ratio is 350 per-
cent in the EU – implies that the fiscal conse-
quences of banking failures are potentially large
enough to bring state solvency into question. In
the absence of a supranational resolution frame-
work, problems in the banking system can raise
doubts about the sovereign’s own creditworthi-
ness – which in turn weakens the value of the
implicit guarantee provided by the state to the
banking system and threatens the solvency of
banks. At the same time, however, domestic banks
still hold on their balance sheets a considerable
share of the debt issued by their domestic gov-
ernments. As each euro-area member is solely
responsible for the debt it has issued, any doubt
about sovereign solvency has the potential to also
harm the banking system. In addition, the ECB
does not have the power or the mandate of a typ-
ical national central bank and it may not ease ten-
sions by playing the role of lender of last resort to
governments, in the way that the Fed or the Bank
of England are allowed to do. As observed by Paul
De Grauwe (2011), these features render the euro
area especially fragile. In the same way, there was
a trilemma between fixed exchange rates, free
capital flows and independent monetary policies:
a sort of impossible, or at least uncomfortable,
trinity between the strict prohibition of monetary
financing, the no co-responsibility for public debt
and the persistence of deeply national banking
systems and banking policies (Pisani-Ferry,
2012).
The second ‘unknown unknown’ revealed by the
euro crisis was the fact that countries within a
monetary union can become subject to balance-
of-payment crises. This possibility was almost
completely overlooked in the pre-EMU literature.
The general agreement was that within a monetary
union, balance of payments would become as
irrelevant as they are across regions within the
same country (see Ingram (1973) for an early
assessment). Persistent current account imbal-
ances were discussed, but they were interpreted
as evidence of capital flowing downhill (as
expected based on theory) and a welcome decou-
pling of savings and investment at national level.
In a way, monetary union was expected to provide
a response to the Feldstein-Horioka paradox
(Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2002). The exception
was Peter Garber (1998) who correctly pointed out
that the TARGET payment system could be the
subject of speculative attacks.
True, current account imbalances can be optimal,
but the type of investment financed in southern
European countries – mainly excessive residen-
tial construction – and the way they were
financed – through volatile sources such as port-
folio debt securities and bank loans – rendered
the deficit countries particularly prone to the
unwinding of capital inflows. As a result, starting
in 2008, and in full force since 2010-11, a reversal
of the massive capital inflows that were invested
‘The euro crisis revealed the ‘unknown unknown’ that countries within a monetary union can
become subject to balance-of-payment crises. This possibility was almost completely
overlooked in the pre-EMU literature.’
Jean Pisani-Ferry  THE KNOWN UNKNOWNS AND UNKNOWN UNKNOWNS OF EMU
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southern countries over last decade has taken
place. This outflow formally qualifies as a sudden
stop (Merler and Pisani-Ferry, 2012). Part (but not
all) of it is explained by developments in the sov-
ereign bond markets, where non-resident
investors have been increasingly off-loading the
bonds issued by the ‘riskier’ countries, showing a
clear connection with the sovereign-banking loop.
Whereas state solvency crises were clearly antic-
ipated, the very possibility of such a sudden stop
affecting a country, rather than specific economic
agents within it, was mostly ignored in the pre-
EMU literature. Early confidence that the financial
markets would have kept on financing all the
viable borrowers regardless of their location was
so strong that policymakers thought it unneces-
sary to open the EU balance-of-payments assis-
tance framework to euro-area countries. 
Starting in 2011, the TARGET2 system became the
topic for prominent discussions after its role in off-
setting capital outflows had been pointed out by
observers, not least Sinn and Wollmerhaeuser
(2011). Indeed private capital outflows have been
matched by an equally sizable inflow of public
capital, in the form of Eurosystem liquidity and
disbursements under the EU/International Mone-
tary Fund programme. This has sheltered the
countries from the full impact of the sudden stop
and accommodated current account deficits at a
time when private markets were no longer willing
to finance them.
The sovereign-banks feedback loop and the bal-
ance-of-payments crisis can be seen as two sides
of the same coin. It is hard to figure out how a
sudden stop in capital inflows could take place in
the absence of contagion between banks and sov-
ereigns. It is the still largely national character of
banking systems that explains why doubt about
the solvency of particular agents (be they sover-
eigns or over-indebted households) translated
into doubts about the solvency of banks and ulti-
mately into a wholesale capital flight.
Policymakers here cannot be held responsible for
not having acted to prevent a type of crisis that
was not really on the economists’ radar screen.
When the decision was made in the Maastricht
negotiations to deprive euro members of the
potential benefit of EU balance-of-payments
assistance, because balance of payments had
become irrelevant, no economist protested. It
would take twenty years to discover that it had
been a mistake.
3 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE POLICY AGENDA
The financial fragility of EMU, and the fact that it
has turned out to be vulnerable to the very kind of
crisis it was supposed to make impossible, call for
a rethink of the original architecture. When decid-
ing what structure to give to the currency union,
policymakers opted in Maastricht for what could
be described as a ‘bare-bones EMU’, which essen-
tially rested on an independent, price-stability ori-
ented central bank and a commitment to
budgetary discipline. This architecture has proved
to be incomplete, for two reasons.
The first reason relates to what the Maastricht
Treaty did include, ie the prevention of fiscal imbal-
ances. It was in fact hoped that fiscal discipline –
fostered by the rules of the Excessive Deficit Pro-
cedure – would be enough to shelter the EMU from
crises. Unfortunately, fiscal rules were under-
enforced, but they were also poorly designed. In
its first ten years, the euro area repeatedly suf-
fered from infringements of fiscal discipline; the
credibility of fiscal rules themselves was signifi-
cantly weakened by the 2003 decision to put the
Excessive Deficit Procedure ‘in abeyance’ when it
was about to start having implications for France
and Germany. More importantly, the rules of the
Stability and Growth Pact ignored the stochastic
character of fiscal crises. It was assumed that they
could be avoided by controlling the deficit on a
yearly basis. When the crisis hit, however, Spain’s
deficit-to-GDP ratio deteriorated by 13 percentage
points in two years, and Ireland’s debt ratio
increased by almost 50 percentage points, also in
‘When the decision was made to deprive euro members of the potential benefit of EU balance-of-
payments assistance, because balance of payments had become irrelevant, no economist
protested. It would take twenty years to discover that it had been a mistake.’
THE KNOWN UNKNOWNS AND UNKNOWN UNKNOWNS OF EMU Jean Pisani-Ferry
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2. The BEPG would have
made possible for the EU to
address to member states
recommendations to adjust
economic policy.
two years. The combination of a deterministic,
rather than risk-based approach to the deficit, and
the neglect of contingent liabilities, made the
Maastricht system very ineffective.  
The second reason has to do with what the Maas-
tricht treaty did not include, ie the prevention of
non-fiscal imbalances. When thinking about pos-
sible threats that EMU should be defended
against, policymakers in Maastricht looked back
at past experience and identified two: inflation and
fiscal laxity. Financial instability was at the time
perceived as being of minor importance and, even
though currency unification was expected to rein-
force financial integration, no provision was envis-
aged to deal with the effects of private credit
booms-and-busts. EMU was conceived as an eco-
nomic and monetary union, not as a financial
union.  True, the EU could have relied on the Broad
Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs), a catch-all
procedure rooted in the treaty, but it was in fact a
weak, non-binding and rather neglected proce-
dure2. This view proved to be short-sighted. While
public indebtedness in the southern countries
remained broadly stable or even declined during
the first decade of EMU, private indebtedness
financed by capital inflows skyrocketed, resulting
in the previously described massive macroeco-
nomic divergence.
The policy response since the first cracks
appeared at end-2009 has developed on three
fronts:
• First, the emphasis has been on creating instru-
ments for crisis management and resolution.
This has been a long, at times acrimonious and
often confusing process, which has cost dearly
in terms of policy credibility, because there was
no initial agreement on how to respond to debt
crises. In the end, after nearly two years, a com-
promise was found at end-2011, paving the
way for debt restructuring and the actual cre-
ation of the European Stability Mechanism
(ESM).
• Second, the fiscal regime has been put back
onto the drawing board. Again, this has taken
several steps and quite a lot of trial-and-error
before agreement was reached in the form of
the new treaty signed in March 2012, the Treaty
on Stability, Cooperation and Governance
(TSCG).
• Third, starting in summer 2012, the need for
more systemic reform was acknowledged,
especially the creation of a banking union
among the members of the euro area, and pos-
sibly other EU countries.
Recognising the systemic character of the prob-
lem was a significant move. In late 2011 it became
increasingly evident that financial integration –
the main achievement of a decade of EMU – was
making way for financial fragmentation and the
retrenchment of borrowers within national bor-
ders. This unmaking of the European financial
market was partly a spontaneous reaction to the
perceived heightened risk of cross-border invest-
ment within the euro area. It was also the result of
pressure exercised by national supervisors to
reduce the cross-border exposure of banks in their
jurisdictions. As a consequence, location became
a key factor explaining differences in the avail-
ability and cost of credit to firms and households. 
Financial fragmentation is evidently a lethal threat
to monetary union. It would make little sense for
participating countries to abide by the disciplines
of a common currency and not be able to reap the
rewards of a common financial market. Further-
more, fragmentation means that the same central
bank policy rate translates into different loan
rates, depending on the location. This is not a sit-
uation that can last for long. Financial autarchy
would finally entail a fundamental change in the
balance between the costs and benefits of partic-
ipating in the euro. For these reasons it became
evident during the course of 2011-12 that initia-
tives to repair the financial underpinnings of the
euro were urgently needed.
Three strategies could be envisaged. The first solu-
tion, widely discussed in the autumn of 2011, was
‘When thinking about threats that EMU should be defended against, policymakers identified
two: inflation and fiscal laxity. Financial instability was perceived as being of minor importance
and no provision was envisaged to deal with the effects of private credit booms-and-busts.’
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3. The Modigliani-Miller the-
orem in this case means
that the aggregate cost of
borrowing is independent of
the structure of funding.
to give the ECB the role of a lender of last resort to
sovereigns. This would not have amounted to
giving it the task of making insolvent countries sol-
vent, but rather to allowing it to prevent self-fulfill-
ing debt crises by keeping the bond rate above the
risk-free rate but below the prevailing market rate.
Assuming this could be done for a limited period,
a possible instrument would be secondary market
purchases. A variant would be to enable the ECB
to provide a credit line to a public entity (the EFSF
in the Gros-Mayer 2011 proposal, the EFSF) in
order to leverage its capital and give it enough fire-
power. This entity would then intervene in the
market. Either way, the ECB would provide liquid-
ity that would help prevent states from being cut
off from financing, and it would help put a ceiling
on what they have to pay to borrow, thereby stem-
ming potentially self-fulfilling debt crises. In a way,
ECB support would serve as a deterrent. 
There are however significant problems with this
approach. First, the ECB does not have an explicit
mandate to act as a lender of last resort for sover-
eigns – it is instead prohibited from entering into
monetary financing – and changing the mandate
would require an unlikely unanimous agreement
of the 27 EU members. Second, unlike the Fed
when it buys US treasury bonds or the Bank of
England when it buys gilts, the ECB is not the cen-
tral bank of a single state and any such move
would inevitably involve distributional dimen-
sions. Should it incur losses on its bond portfolio
the ECB would have to request from its sharehold-
ers the injection of additional capital, thereby
becoming a vehicle for fiscal transfers – some-
thing central banks are not made for. This largely
explains why the ECB was uncomfortable with the
Securities Market Programme, the bond purchase
scheme it launched in May 2010 (for Greece and
Portugal), reactivated in August 2011 (for Spain
and Italy), and finally let expire. 
The ECB's September 2012 decision to initiate a
scheme called Outright Monetary Transactions
(OMT), which will make it able to purchase short-
dated government paper of countries benefitting
from a support programme negotiated with the
European Stability Mechanism, can be regarded
as yet another step in this direction. However the
ECB has made it clear this time that its primary
intention is only to address the effects of financial
fragmentation, that its focus is on credit condi-
tions faced by private agents, and that it is not
going to purchase longer-dated government
bonds. It is doubtful it will go further and accept a
role in the containment of state insolvency.
A second possibility could be to move closer to a
fiscal union by mutualising the guarantee on the
public debt issued by euro-area counties, via
some form of ‘Eurobond’. The aim would be cre-
ation of a euro-area safe asset, because sover-
eigns would be jointly and severally liable for debt.
It is unlikely that all of the debt would be mutu-
alised. Rather, it could be split into two parts, with
the mutualised part presumably senior to the non-
mutualised part (Delpla and Weizsäcker, 2010).
As a quid pro quo, states would lose the freedom
to issue debt at will. The policy system would
move from a framework of ex-post sanctions in
case of infringement of common rules, to a frame-
work of strong ex-ante control, with member states
agreeing to submit their budgets for approval.
Should a draft budget fail to respect common prin-
ciples, the euro-area partners could veto it before
its entry into force. 
Eurobonds would in principle have three types of
benefits (Claessens and Vallée, 2012):
• First they would create a common safe asset
for the euro area.
• Second, they would protect sovereign states
from acute funding crises as these would
always retain access to issuance, at least for
amounts corresponding to redemptions
(though in a dual scheme the Modigliani-Miller
theorem would apply, leaving the average cost
of borrowing constant3). The interaction of
these two benefits would make banks more
secure and better protect states from self-ful-
filling solvency crises.
• Third, by subscribing to Eurobonds and accept-
ing the necessarily-associated scrutiny of
national public finances, euro-area members
would signal that they are willing to accept the
full consequences of participation in the mon-
etary union.
There are however significant hurdles before
Eurobonds could become a reality. First,
Eurobonds and ex-ante approval would represent
THE KNOWN UNKNOWNS AND UNKNOWN UNKNOWNS OF EMU Jean Pisani-Ferry
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a major step in the process of European integra-
tion that would require a significant revision of the
Treaty. Second, the potential benefits from
Eurobonds would be unevenly distributed. Ger-
many in particular benefits from a safe-haven
effect that would almost certainly be lost after
debt mutualisation, with consequences for its
public finances. From a German perspective such
a choice would represent an investment into the
sustainability and the stability of the euro area,
which requires firm guarantees from its partners.
In turn, for the partners, giving such firm guaran-
tees to Germany would amount to accepting the
surrender of budgetary sovereignty. Third,
Eurobonds are regarded by some euro-area poli-
cymakers as an incentive to fiscal irresponsibility
and for transfers from fiscally sound to fiscally
weak countries. 
The remaining possibility is to build a banking
union, which could help break the vicious cycle
linking banks and sovereigns. This was the road
chosen by the heads of state and government in
June 2012. A number of important questions
however arise. Beyond significant technicalities
(which banks should be covered? Which countries
should participate? How should supervisory
responsibilities be divided up?), the more
important issues involve the organisation of
resolution and a fiscal backstop4. Banking union
first requires a strong commitment to giving a
European authority the responsibility for resolving
banks and minimising the cost to taxpayers.
Second, it amounts to a sort of fiscal union, but
limited to a certain type of contingent liabilities. It
will also involve European authorities in
distributing bank losses between shareholders,
creditors and depositors, as well as between
national and European partners. These are
potentially very political choices and it is by no
means a trivial decision to let a European entity
assume responsibility for them. 
It also remains to be seen if banking union will be
sufficient to repair financial integration in the euro
area. it is certainly necessary to protect the states
from their banks – and the banks from their sov-
ereigns – but this may not be sufficient to per-
suade investors to purchase bonds from countries
they have learned to distrust.
Beyond banking union, many questions remain
about what a well-functioning and resilient
monetary union might entail. Here also there are
known unknowns – the need for market flexibility
and a robust fiscal framework – but also unknown
unknowns. Will public debt mutualisation be
required to rescue financial integration? Will
agglomeration effects lead to a concentration of
production in a few areas, implying the need for
transfers? Will labour mobility develop into a
powerful adjustment mechanism? The journey
has started, but where it will lead is still partially
uncertain.
4. Banking union issues are
discussed in Pisani-Ferry,
Sapir, Véron and Wolff
(2012) and Pisani-Ferry
and Wolff (2012).
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